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Comment
ONE MAN-ONE VOTE AND JUDICIAL SELECTION
By legislative enactment, the 1969 Nebraska Legislature created
the Nebraska Constitutional Revision Commission, effective May
26, 1969.1 As an outgrowth of this legislation, the commission com-
prehensively reviewed the Constitution of Nebraska and presented
its suggestions and recommendations for revision of the constitution
in a report dated September 24, 1970.2 Substantial changes were
made in Article V, the judicial article. The fourth recommended
revision deals with the redistricting of judicial districts through
the provisions of Article V, section 5.3 This comment examines
the redistricting provisions of Article V, section 5 in light of the con-
stitutional requirements for equality in voting, and the possible
constitutional implications of the suggested revisions.
I. HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN NEBRASKA
As in most states, most redistricting activity has occurred in the
area of legislative redistricting for voting purposes. The first pro-
visions for establishment of legislative districts are found in the
1854 congressional act creating the Nebraska Territory with pro-
visions for a governor and legislative assembly.4 The Organic Law
provided that "An apportionment shall be made, as nearly equal as
practicable, among the several counties or districts, for the election
of the council and representatives, giving to each section of the
territory representation in the ratio of its qualified voters as nearly
as may be."5
Subsequently, in 1866, the first state constitution was drafted
and accepted by Congress on March 1, 1867.6 This constitution pro-
vided that the legislature was to take a census each ten years, in
and following 1875, and "apportion and district anew the numbers
of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the num-
bers of inhabitants, excluding Indians not taxed, and soldiers and
officers of the United States army and navy.''1
1 NEB. REv. STAT. § 49-239 (Supp. 1969).
2 REPORT OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMVIUSSION
(1970).
3 Id. at 51.
4 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
5 Id. at 278.
6 NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, NEBRASKA BLUE Boox 46 (1968).
NEB. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1867).
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In 1875 the Constitution of Nebraska was revised and reappor-
tionment was provided for on a ten-year census basis.8 Here it must
be pointed out that the state was operating with a two house legis-
lature and provision was made for equal representation in each of
the two representative bodies.
The constitution was not altered or amended again until 1919
when it was amended to provide for the creation of election dis-
tricts "as nearly equal in population as may be and composed of
contiguous and compact territory."9 Following the 1919 amendment
for redistricting, the constitution was not amended for fifteen years.
In 1934 the Nebraska Constitution was amended to establish a uni-
cameral legislature.' 0 Under the provisions of Article III, section
5 of the Nebraska Constitution of 1919, as amended in 1934, appor-
tionment was to be based on population figures determined by the
federal decennial census. The legislature was empowered to reap-
portion and redistrict "from time to time, but not oftener than once
in ten years."'" This could be done when the population figures
reflected that it was "necessary to a correction of inequalities in the
population of such districts."' 2
Nebraska saw no further activity along the lines of redistricting
of legislative districts between 1935 and 1962, when the League of
Nebraska Municipalities challenged the 1936 apportionment scheme
in League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh.13 That case, insti-
tuted shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided Baker
v. Carr,4 sought to have Article III, section 5 of the Nebraska
Constitution, as amended in 1934, declared unconstitutional, to have
the legislative elections slated for November 6, 1962, restrained
until apportionment was properly provided for, and to enjoin sub-
mission of a proposed amendment to the electorate35 The case was
not heard and decided until July 20, 1962, and, in view of the late
hour, the court denied all relief, fearing a total upsetting of the
8 NEB. CoNsT. art. I I, § 2 (1875).
9 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1919).
10 NEB. CONST. art. 1I, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 24 (1934).
11 Nra. CONST. art I1, § 5 (1934).
12 Id.
13 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962).
'4 369 U S. 186 (1962).
15 The amendment was embodied in L.B. 217 as passed by the 1961 Ne-
braska Legislature. It provided for an amendment to Article I,
section 5 of the Nebraska Constitution to allow for multiple districts
within populous counties of the state and to allow redistricting to be
determined on a combined basis of population and area.
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elective process for the upcoming election if a last minute remedy
were attempted. It did, however, retain continuing jurisdiction
over the case for possible future ligitation. 10
The amendment to Article III, section 5, passed by the 1961
Legislature, was approved by the electorate on November 6, 1962.
It provided for redistricting legislative districts when necessary,
but not more often than every ten years.' 7 In 1964, the League of
Nebraska Municipalities breathed new life into their former suit,
this time challenging the validity of the constitutional apportion-
ment provisions accepted by the people of Nebraska in 1962. In
League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh,8 the same three judge
court which had decided the 1962 case found that the 1962 consti-
tutional amendment was invalid, relying on the numerous reap-
portionment cases which had been decided by the United States
Supreme Court on June 15, 1964.19 Again this court refused to enjoin
the holding of upcoming elections, but stated that the legislature
would "have de facto status when it meets for regular session in
January, 1965; that it should have 'an opportunity to fashion a con-
stitutionally valid legislative apportionment plan'....-20
The 1965 Legislature, in L.B. 628,21 sought to correct the deficiency
in its legislative apportionment but this was again struck down in
the 1965 case of League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh.22 The
thrust of the court's refusal to accept the plan presented in L.B. 628
was that, as written, it required that county lines be followed in
the establishment of legislative districts.23
The League of Nebraska Municipalities challenged the suc-
cessor to L.B. 628 when it brought an action seeking to declare
L.B. 92524 invalid. In League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh,2
the court found that the redistricting scheme of L.B. 925, which
provided for a maximum of seven percent deviation from the ideal
median population, was sufficiently within the ambit of U.S. Su-
16 209 F. Supp. at 196.
"7 NEB. CoNsT. art. III, § 5 (1962).
18 232 F. Supp. 411 (D. Neb. 1964).
19 See 232 F. Supp. at 412 for a complete listing of the cases relied upon
by the court.
20 232 F. Supp. at 414.
21 NEs. SEss. LAws, c. 21, p. 159 (1965).
22 242 F. Supp. 357 (D. Neb. 1965), dismissed under S. Ct. Rule 60, 382 U.S.
1021 (1966).
23 Id. at 360-61.
24 NEB. SEss. LAws, c. 22, p. 171 (1965).
25 253 F. Supp. 27 (D. Neb. 1966).
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preme Court standards to be valid.26 Thus, Nebraska's present ap-
portionment provisions were finally declared to be acceptable.27
II. REDISTRICTING AND JUDICIAL DISTRICTS
The 1969 Constitutional Revision Commission suggested chang-
ing Article V, section 5 because it felt "that Supreme Court judicial
districts should be proportioned to population" and therefore rec-
omnmended "that they be redistricted after each decennial census.128
The revision of this section, and the inclusion of provisions for reap-
portionment of the judicial districts, presents several problems. The
first of these is whether the one man-one vote requirement attaches
to a meritorious vote on state supreme court justices. The one man-
one vote principle has been applied by the United States Supreme
Court in numerous opinions, but none has dealt with meritorious
voting. From these opinions a determination of their applicability
in this context must be made.
The Court first passed on the one man-one vote question in 1962,
in Baker -v. Carr,2 9 where the Court determined that the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution required that each man's
vote be relatively equal in weight with every other man's vote in
a given state. Though Baker first handled the problem of standing
and whether or not redistricting was a political question, after mak-
ing the issue a justiciable one, it set down the broad general rule
that the one man-one vote principle is applicable to a federal elec-
tion. In Reynolds v. Sims,30 the Court extended the same principle
to elections for state legislators, finding that each citizen of a voting
district had the right to have his vote weigh equally with that of
every other citizen of his state in a given election. 3l The Court ap-
26 Id. at 34.
27 Two later federal district court cases dealt with similar Nebraska
reapportionment problems. In Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 603
(D. Neb. 1967), a 3 judge panel held that the 3 congressional districts
created under a 1961 Nebraska act (NEB. REv. STAT. § 5-101 (Reissue
1964)) were so unequal that the law was unconstitutional. Subse-
quently in 1968, the Nebraska Legislature passed a new congressional
redistricting plan. This was upheld by the same 3 judge court in Exon
v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1968).
28 REPORT OF THE NEBRAsKA CONSTITUTIONAL R IsIoN CommISSION 64
(1970).
29 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
30 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
31 "Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects the right
of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as in federal elections."
Id. at 554.
646 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 4 (1971)
plied this same principle to a large number of similar cases, at the
time limiting it almost exclusively to state legislative elections. 32
Within a relatively short period after deciding Reynolds, the
Court began to apply the one man-one vote principle more strictly
and in more diverse situations. In Lucas v. 44th General Assembly of
Colorado3" the Court invalidated a state legislative apportionment
plan, which had been presented to and passed by the voters of
Colorado, holding that:
An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally
weighted vote cannot be denied even by a vote of the majority of
a State's electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by the
voters fails to measure up to the requirements of the Equal Protection
Clause . . . . We hold that the fact that a challenged legislative
apportionment plan was approved by the electorate is without federal
constitutional significance, if the scheme adopted fails to satisfy the
basic requirements of the Equal Protection Clause, as delineated in
our opinion in Reynolds v. Sims. 3 4
The Court made similar application of the Equal Protection
Clause in local representative elections in 1968 when in Avery v.
Midland County Commissioner 5 the Court found that equal pro-
tection must be afforded the electorate in a vote for a county
commissioner's position. The far-reaching impact of this case was
noted in that it would effect the local elections of more than eighty
thousand units of local government. 6 The Court did not stop at the
level of local representative government, but in 1970 applied the
one man-one vote principle to the election of school trustees in
Hadley v. Junior College District of Metropolitan Kansas City.3 7
Having then traced the application of the Equal Protection
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment from the federal election of
representatives down to the local election of a school's trustees, the
question still remains whether the court would give similar treat-
ment to a merit vote by the electorate on a judicial officer in a
judicial district.
32 See generally R. CoaRTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 222-66 (1970)
for an excellent general alignment of the cases in which the primary
emphasis was placed on the establishment of voting equality in state
legislative elections.
33 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
34 Id. at 736-37.
35 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
36 R. CORTNEa, supra note 32, at 256.
2T 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
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The Constitution of Nebraska provides: "The powers of the gov-
ernment of this state are divided into three distinct departments,
the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection
of persons being one of these departments, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except as hereinafter
expressly directed or permitted."38 The constitution then provides
for the election of legislators in Article III, section 7; for the election
of parties to fill the executive offices in the executive branch of the
state government in Article IV, section 1; and for the initial ap-
pointment but subsequent merit reelection of judges in Article V,
section 21. The Supreme Court, in most of its reapportionment cases,
has dealt with positions wherein general governmental powers
were conferred upon the office which is the subject of the particular
election at issue. However, the Court has also repeatedly pointed
out that "in each case a constant factor is the decision of the govern-
ment to have citizens participate individually by ballot in the se-
lection of certain people who carry out governmental functions."8 9
The Court in Hadley further stated that "the crucial consideration is
the right of each qualified voter to participate on an equal footing
in the election process."40
Based on the fact that the Nebraska Constitution creates the
judiciary as a branch of state government separate and distinct
from that of the other two branches, and provides the state's elec-
torate with voting right to determine the judiciary's membership
and officeholders, as is done with the other two branches, it would
seem that the same protections for the right to vote would attach
to the vote on judicial offices as for the legislative and executive
offices. The question has come up for review in several federal
district courts, but the presiding judges have dismissed allegations
that the one man-one vote principle attaches to judicial selection.
Distinguishing between legislative and executive election, the court
in Stokes v. FortsonA1 stated: "[J]udges and prosecutors are not
representatives in the same sense as are legislators or the executive.
Their function is to administer the law, not to espouse the cause of
a particular constituency." 42 Similarly in Romiti v. Kerner,43 the
court, though not deciding the issue, stated: "We have little doubt
that, in a proper case, there is a valid distinction between applying
38 NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1.
39 397 U.S. at 54.
40 Id. at 55.
41 234 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
42 Id. at 577.
43 256 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. IU. 1966).
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the 'one man, one vote' rule in a legislative reapportionment case to
the election of a state supreme court judiciary as provided in the
1962 Judicial Article.""
It cannot be denied that there are differences between the
function of the judiciary and that of the legislative or executive
branches, but the distinction presented in Stokes and Romiti is of
little utility in light of more recent Supreme Court opinions. It
should be pointed out here that we are dealing with a federal
constitutional question even though the situation through which it
arises has its foundation in a state constitutional provision. In
Hadley the Court stated:
It has also been urged that we distinguish for apportionment pur-
poses between elections for "legislative" officials and those for "ad-
ministrative" officers. Such a suggestion would leave courts with an
equally unmanageable principle since governmental activities "can-
not easily be classified in the neat categories favored by civics texts,"
... and it must also be rejected.45
Since the Nebraska Constitution provides that "[a]ll elections shall
be free; and there shall be no hindrance or impediment to the
right of a qualified voter to exercise the elective franshise," 6 it
would seem that when looking only to the question of whether a
vote in a judicial election is to receive the protection of the one
man-one vote principle, the answer must be in the affirmative. As
the Court stated in Hadley:
We therefore hold today that as a general rule, whenever a state
or local government decides to select persons by popular election to
perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must
be given an equal opportunity to participate in that election, and
when members of an elected body are chosen from separate districts,
each district must be established on a basis which will insure, as
far as practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for pro-
portionally equal numbers of officials. 47
Extension of the one man-one vote principle to judicial elections
could, and in all probability would, be brought within the purview
of Avery and Hadley, if the election presented a potential judge to
the electorate for the first time, thus creating a need for the pro-
posed redistricting provisions of Article V, section 5. It is submitted
that the rationale behind the extension of the one man-one vote
principle to these cases would follow much the same type of ration-
44 Id. at 46.
45 397 U.S. at 55-56.
46 NEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 22.
47 397 U.S. at 56.
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ale as just presented. The close question which still remains is
whether the requirement would extent to a vote in a merit election.
Nebraska, in accord with most of the United States," has adopted
the "Missouri Plan" for judicial selection and tenure. The Missouri
Plan is a method of judicial selection wherein:
[wihen a vacancy occurs in a state court, the governor makes an
appointment from a list of three candidates presented to him by a
commission or committee....
The judge, once selected, holds office until the next general elec-
tion, at which time the electorate is asked whether the judge should
be retained in office. If the vote is yes, the judge serves another
term in office; if the vote is no, another judge is appointed as out-
lined above.49
Nebraska adopted this plan by constitutional admendment on No-
vember 6, 1962."°
The idea of utilizing a merit plan such as the Missouri Plan for
judicial selection had been the subject of considerable Nebraska
State Bar Association activity prior to 1950. At that time the Asso-
ciation adopted the "American Bar Association Plan for Selection
and Tenure of Judges" by resolution at its annual meeting.51 Based
on a bar association referendum which found the majority of its
members in favor of a merit plan, the judiciary committee of the
Nebraska Bar Association prepared a constitutional amendment for
submission to the electorate of the state in the 1954 general elec-
tion. 52 This effort, however, failed for lack of the requisite number
of petition signatures to place the proposed amendment on the
ballot.G3 In 1958, a proposed constitutional amendment, L.B. 354,
was again prepared by the bar association's judiciary committee.
This proposed amendment was submitted to the Nebraska Legisla-
ture Judiciary Committee during the 1959 regular session of the
legislature.54 This bill died in committee, having been "indefinitely
postponed."55
48 See Note, Constitutional Revision--Judicial Selection-The "Missouri
Plan?' for New Mexico?, 9 NATURAL REsouRcs J., 435-36 (1969).
49 Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A.J. 1162-
63 (1969).
50 NEBRAsKA LEGIsLATVr CouNcIL, NEBRASKA BLuE Boox 70 n.7 (1968).
For a comprehensive history of Nebraska's adoption of the Missouri
Plan, see Haggert, The Case for the Nebraska Merit Plan, 41 NEB. L.
Rnv. 723 (1962).
51 Report of the Committee on Judiciary, 38 NEB. L. REv. 77 (1959).
52 Cronin, President's Address, 34 NEB. L. REv. 217 (1955).
53 Report of the Committee on Judiciary, supra note 51.
5A L.B. 354, 69th Neb. Leg. Sess. (1959).
55 69th NEB. LEG. J. 2452 (1959).
650 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 4 (1971)
The bar association again had a proposed constitutional amend-
ment prepared and presented to the judiciary committee during
the 1961 regular session. The amendment was advanced in the
form of L.B. 31556 and received the approval of Nebraska voters on
November 6, 1962. 5 7 The implementation of the merit plan in Ne-
braska required the revision of a number of constitutional sections.58
The principal section, however, was Article V, section 21.59 That
section provides for the creation of a nominating commission, 60
terms of office and provisions for periodic reelection,6 ' and the gov-
ernor's right to appoint new judges in the event of a vacancy.62
The Constitutional Revision Commission recommended alter-
ation of certain portions of the merit plan as orginally enacted.
The appointment provision of Article IV, section 11 has been com-
pletely altered by the revision; 3 however, it does not in any way
affect the operation of the merit plan as a whole. Additionally,
Article V, section 5 has been revised, but again the basic function-
ing of the plan is not altered.
Does Article V, section 21 (3) of the Nebraska Constitution im-
plicitly require that the judicial districts created in Article V, sec-
tion 5, be of equal population? It would seem to be a logical exten-
sion of the rule of Hadley that "whenever a state or local govern-
ment decides to select persons by popular election to perform govern-
mental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given an
equal opportunity to participate in that election ... ."6 This rule
finds application to the merit election plan under the Nebraska
Constitution. Since Article II, section 1 provides for a threefold
division of governmental powers and Article V, section 21 allows
the electorate to pass on the qualifications of the judicial office
holder by voting, it follows that this voting right must be protected,
both under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
and under Article I, section 22 of the Nebraska Constitution. It is
56 NEB. SESs. LAWS, c. 25a, p. 741 (1961).
57 NEBRASKA LEGISLATIVE CouNcIL, NEBRASKA BLuE BOOK 70 n.21 (1968).
58 Adoption of the merit plan necessitated amending NEB. CONST. art.
IV, § 11, and art. V, §§ 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20 and 21.
59 Haggert, supra note 50.
60 NEB. CONST. art V, § 21(4).
61 Id. § 21(3).
62 Id. art. IV, § 11 and art. V, § 21(1).
63 REPORT OF THE NEBRAsKA CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMmISSION 40,
49-50 (1970).
64 397 U.S. at 56.
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true that the voting process in issue at this point is not the same
type of selection process as in the situation where one of two or
more candidates is chosen, but it would seem to be an unduly
narrow construction of the term "select"16 5 to deny that choosing be-
tween returning a man to a position he now holds on his merits,
or removing him from that position in favor of filling it with an-
other is not "selection" It is submitted that there can be no logical or
legal reason, valid within the guidelines established by the U.S.
Supreme Court, why the one man-one vote protection is not appli-
cable to an electorate's vote in a judicial election.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF USING ESTABLISHED LINES
AS ELECTORAL DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
The suggested revision of Article V, section 5 also contains sub-
stantially altered language pertaining to the manner in which judi-
cial districts are established. 6 Besides the different wording of the
section, 7 the revision also brings it into harmony with the reap-
portionment plan for the legislature found in Article III, section
5. A few minor changes in the legislatvie reapportionment section
have also been recommended.6 8 The question now presented is
whether the language providing for the reapportionment and re-
districting of the judicial and legislative districts is such that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause by precluding the establish-
ment of independent boundaries for the districts if equal population
cannot be provided by use of established boundaries. Here the issue
65 WEBsTEe's 3D NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONAnY 2058 (1961): "To choose
from a number or group, usually by fitness, excellence or other dis-
tinguishing feature."
66 "[T]he Legislature shall redistrict the state after each federal decen-
nial census. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed
whenever practicable, but other established lines may be followed
at the discretion of the Legislature. Such districts shall --it be changed
except upon the concurrence of a majority of the rninibers of the
Legislature .... ." REPORT OF TiE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL RISION
COmmssIoN 54 (1970).
67 "The Legislature shall divide the state along county lines into six
compact districts of approximately equal population, which shall be
numbered from one to six, consecutive numbers to be given adjacent
districts and shall be the Supreme Court judicial districts. Such dis-
tricts shall not be changed, except upon the concurrence of two-thirds
of the members of the Legislature, nor shall any such change vacate
the office of any judge." Nm. CONsT. art. V, § 5.
68 "The Legislature shall redistrict the state after each federal decennial
census. In any such redistricting, county lines shall be followed
whenever practicable, but other established lines may be followed at
the discretion of the Legislature." Nm. CONST. art. I1, § 5.
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is not whether the legislature has the power to reapportion, but
whether the means and guidelines used are adequate.
The Nebraska Constitution requires the use of county lines or
other established lines in creating districts for elective purposes.69
However, the United States Supreme Court decided two companion
cases in 1969 which seem to severely challenge the constitutionality
of the Nebraska Constitution's boundary requirement. Kirkpatrick
v. Preislere0 evolved out of a Missouri state congressional redis-
tricting plan wherein the state was divided into congressional dis-
tricts which varied from "3.13% above the mathematical ideal"
to "2.84% below."17 Missouri argued that the variances should be
considered in the light of other factors.72 The Court rejected this,
stating: "[W]e do not find legally acceptable the argument that
variances are justified if they necessarily result from a State's at-
tempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing con-
gressional district lines along existing county, municipal, or other
political subdivision boundaries. ' 73 Similarly, in Wells v. Rocke-
feller,7 4 the Court refused to allow a redistricting plan to stand:
To accept a scheme such as New York's would permit groups of
districts with defined interest orientations to be over-represented
at the expense of districts with different interest orientations. Equal-
ity of population among districts in a substate is not a justification
for inequality among all the districts in the State.7 5
Application of the Wells and Preisler cases to the Nebraska
,constitutional provisions is extremely difficult absent a test plan
wherein actual population figures are available. It would seem,
however, that the construction of the words "established lines" will
be determinative of the validity of the constitutional section in a
.given case. If variations or deviations of any substance are pre-
sented, the courts will, of necessity, require the state to "present...
.acceptable reasons for variations among the populations of the
69 REPORT OF THE NEBRAsKA CONSTiTuzrONAL REVSION COi\NUSSION 16
(1970).
-0 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
'71 Id. at 528-29.
,72 "[I]t is contended that the [Missouri] General Assembly provided
for variances out of legitimate regard for such factors as the repre-
sentation of distinct interest groups, the integrity of county lines, the
compactness of districts . . . ." Id. at 530.
.73 Id. at 533-34.
'74 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
•.5 Id. at 546.
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various.., districts .... "7 Conversely, if the legislature establishes
equal population districts by use of a broad interpretation of the
constitution, redistricting can be accomplished notwithstanding a
court's review of the tentative plan.77
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Constitution, by providing that the judicial branch
of state government shall be separate and distinct from the legisla-
tive and executive, has indicated that that branch should be ac-
corded the same type of treatment accorded the other two. Through
constitutional provisions similar to those provided for the legisla-
tive and executive branches, the people of the state are given the
opportunity to vote on the continued tenure of state judges. Though
the choice is not between a number of candidates, the voter never-
theless retains the right to have the vote which he casts on a given
judge be given weight equal to that of every other Nebraska voter.
Since the lawmakers have seen fit to allow the electorate to vote
on a judge, they are also required to protect that vote. Therefore,
the proposed revision of Article V, section 5 is necessary. Retention
of the merit plan for judicial selection requires that every man be
accorded an equal right to pass on the merits of each judge. While
the vote cast is not the same as in an election where a choice is
made between candidates, it still involves the constitutionally pro-
tected exercise of the voting franchise. By making provisions for
the legislature to redistrict judicial districts on a decennial basis,
the Constitutional Revision Commission has brought Article V,
section 5 within the legally acceptable standards established by the
United States Supreme Court granting to the people the opportun-
ity to cast a fairly weighted ballot.
The problem of the use of "established lines" by the legislature
in the redistricting of elective districts is one which remains un-
answered. It is a problem which can only be resolved on the facts
of each case presented. If a plan can be devised wherein established
lines are followed, but in which substantial equality among the
districts is produced, then the plan will stand. Conversely, if sub-
stantial equality cannot be obtained by the use of established lines,
but the planning body is precluded from violating the established
lines because of the constitution, it is submitted that such a section
76 Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1967). See generally Moore v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
77 For a general discussion of various suggested modes of reapportioning
states for election districts, see REAPPORTIONING LEGISLATURES (H. Ham-
ilton ed. 1966-).
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will be stricken as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has stated
that "the weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on
where he lives.178 The courts most certainly will not ignore the fact
that some sort of guideline must be used in determining where one
district must end and the other begin. "The state legislatures have
devised, and the courts have generally tolerated, a variety of solu-
tions to the problem of giving the various partisan and other inter-
ests with the metropolis an equitable voice .... ,,79 Such is the case
with Nebraska's constitutional reapportionment provisions.
Denis R. Maim '72
78 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
79 Jewell, Criteria Reflected in Recent Apportionments, in REAPPORTION-
ING LEGISLATURES 21, 22 (H. Hamilton ed. 1966).
